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No. 20070730-SC

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
LEMANDA LILLIAN M E C H A M ,

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
S E A N D. FRAZIER AND DAVID L. J O H N S O N ,

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Appellants

Statement of Jurisdiction
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an
order certifying two questions of state law to this Court. This Court accepted
the certified questions in an order entered October 31, 2007. Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (West Supp. 2007), this Court has original
jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a federal court.

Issues Presented
1.

Immunity from suit
Utah's governmental immunity act requires a claimant to file a notice

of claim identifying the nature of the asserted claim before filing suit. This
requirement is a jurisdictional precondition to filing suit. The act also
requires that, to bring a personal capacity claim against a state officer, a
claimant must allege that the employee acted with fraud or malice. Where a
claimant fails to identify the nature of her claim as a personal capacity claim
- by not alleging fraud or malice in her notice of claim - has she failed to
meet a jurisdictional precondition, thereby rendering the state officers
immune from suit?

A.

Standard of Review

When a federal court certifies questions of state law, this Court
answers "the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying
dispute." In re Kurtz, 2004 UT 71, <|[6, 99 P.3d 793.

2.

Allegation of fraud or malice
To bring a claim against a state officer personally, a plaintiff is required

to allege in her notice of claim that the state officer acted with fraud or
2

malice. This Court has adopted the reasoning of the Utah Court of Appeals
that a notice of claim was insufficient when it merely alleged facts from which
malice could be inferred but did not expressly allege fraud or malice. Should
this Court follow its precedent and continue to require that an express
allegation of fraud or malice be included in a notice of claim to properly
identify a personal capacity claim?

A.

Standard of Review

When a federal court certifies questions of state law, this Court
answers "the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying
dispute." Kunz, 2004 UT 71 at <|[6.

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are attached as Addendum 2 to this Brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11

3

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
Lemanda Mecham sued Utah Highway Patrol Troopers Sean Frazier

and David Johnson in federal district court. Aplt. App. at 1-2, 3, 10-19.
Mecham raised one federal claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and seven state law
claims. Aplt. App. at 14-18.
Defendants moved to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Aplt. App. at 20-37. The federal district court denied the
defendants' motion, and defendants challenged that denial in an interlocutory
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Aplt. App.
at 4, 71-73, 74-75. The appeal was brought under the collateral order
doctrine, which grants the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory
appeal of a denial of an immunity claim. From that appeal, the Tenth Circuit
certified two questions of state law to this Court.

2.

Course of the Proceedings in the Federal Courts
Lemanda Mecham filed this action against Utah State Highway Patrol

Troopers Sean Frazier and David Johnson in 2004. Aplt. App. at 1-2.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Aplt. App. at 2. While denying the
motion to dismiss as to the federal claim, the district court dismissed the
4

plaintiffs state claims because the complaint was insufficient as to those
claims. Aplt. App. at 2-3. The plaintiff was given time to file an amended
complaint. Aplt. App. at 3. Mecham filed an amended complaint. Aplt. App. at
3, 10-19. The amended complaint raised one federal claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
and seven state law claims. Aplt. App. at 14-18.
Defendants moved to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Aplt. App. at 20-37. The district court denied the
defendants' motion and defendants appealed. Aplt. App. at 4, 71-73, 74-75.
The Tenth Circuit entered an order on September 11, 2007, certifying
two questions of state law to this Court.1 This Court accepted the certified
questions on October 31, 2007.

3.

Disposition in the Federal Courts
The Tenth Circuit appeal has been abated pending resolution of the

questions certified to this Court. In a related appeal, Mecham u. Frazier, —
F.3d —, 2007 WL 2608624 (10th Cir. 2007), Docket No. 05-4297, the Tenth

footnote three of the Tenth Circuit's certification order incorrectly
states that the new version of Utah's immunity act requires merely an
allegation of negligence to bring a personal capacity claim against a
government employee. The act, however, expressly limits personal capacity
suits to only those injuries resulting from fraud or willful misconduct, the use
of alcohol or drugs, or perjury. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-202(3)(c).
5

Circuit reversed the federal district court's denial of qualified immunity on
the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, concluding that the defendants did not violate
Mecham's constitutional rights.

Statement of Facts
In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged one federal and seven state
law causes of action against the defendants. Aplt. App. at 14-18. Defendants
Frazier and Johnson were "troopers and/or employees of the Utah Highway
Patrol." Aplt. App. at 11 <J5. The defendants'
authority to act was derived from Utah state law and their own
authority and/or commands and directives of their superiors. All
of the acts of the individuals and entities listed in the preceding
paragraphs were performed under color of the laws, statutes,
ordinances, of the State of Utah and the regulations, policies,
customs, and usages [of] defendants' respective law enforcement
agencies."
Aplt. App. at 11f7.
In her notice of claim, Mecham did not expressly allege that the
defendants acted with either fraud or malice. Aplt. App. at 33-36 (attached as
Addendum 1). She alleged that they used "unreasonable and excessive force
in arresting her" and that they "were negligent in their use of force which
negligence caused her permanent and chronic injury." Aplt. App. at 33.
Mecham's notice of claim repeatedly stated that Frazier and Johnson had

6

been negligent or unreasonable, but not that they had acted with either fraud
or malice. Aplt. App. at 35.

Summary of the Argument
Utah's governmental immunity act confers on state officers immunity
from suit when a plaintiff fails to comply with the act's notice of claim
requirements. Those requirements are a jurisdictional precondition to suit,
thereby barring the lawsuit altogether when not met, not merely immunizing
a state officer from liability.
To bring a claim against a state officer personally, a plaintiffs notice of
claim must specifically aver that the state officer acted with fraud or malice.
It is not enough to allege facts from which fraud or malice can be inferred.
Because plaintiff did not specifically allege fraud or malice in her notice of
claim, her state law claims are jurisdictionally barred.

7

ARGUMENT
1.

Because its notice of claim provision imposes a jurisdictional
precondition to filing suit, Utah's immunity act confers on state
officers immunity from suit, not merely immunity from liability, when
that jurisdictional precondition is not met

This Court's order accepting certified questions of state law, asks the
parties to answer this question posed by the Tenth Circuit: Does the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act2 confer to state officers an immunity from suit
(immediately appealable) or merely an immunity from liability (not
immediately appealable)?
The Tenth Circuit's use of "immediately appealable" refers to
interlocutory appeals within the federal system. An interlocutory appeal may
be taken as a matter of right, under the collateral order doctrine, from a
federal district court's denial of a claim of immunity from suit:
Pursuant to the federal collateral order doctrine, we have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear "appeals of orders denying motions to
dismiss where the motions are based on immunity from suit."
State law governs the scope of the immunity at issue (i.e.,
whether the immunity is "immunity from suit" or merely
"immunity from liability").

2

At the time of Mecham's alleged injury, the immunity act was codified
at Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 through -38. Because Mecham's alleged injury
arose before July 1, 2004, this action continues to be "governed by the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 2004
Laws of Utah ch. 267, § 48.
8

Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med. v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist, 353 F.3d 832,
837 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that court will look to substantive state law in
determining the nature and scope of claimed immunity) (citations omitted).
See also Decker v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1992)
(stating that denial of claim for immunity from liability, as opposed to
immunity from suit, is not collateral order that is immediately appealable).
No such doctrine exists under state law, where interlocutory appeals are not
allowed as a matter of right. See Utah R. App. P. 5.
Because the immunity act's notice of claim provision imposes a
jurisdictional precondition to filing suit, the act confers on state officers
immunity from suit, not merely immunity from liability, in cases where that
jurisdictional precondition is not met. Defendants' motion to dismiss was
based on Mecham's failure to strictly comply with the immunity act's notice of
claim provisions. This Court has held that the immunity act should be strictly
applied so as to preserve sovereign immunity:
In analyzing the parties' positions, we must keep in mind
that the legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as
essential to the protection of the state in rendering the many and
ever increasing number of governmental services. . . . In a
prefatory section of the Act, the legislature made this abundantly
clear: Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function. . . . This . . .

9

indicate [s] an intention t h a t the act be strictly applied to preserve
sovereign immunity.
Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996) (citations and
internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original).
This strict application standard is why this Court has repeatedly ruled
t h a t strict compliance with the requirements of the U t a h Governmental
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Rushton
Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,1119, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick,
P.2d 245, 249-50 (Utah 1988). Scarborough

v.

769

v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d

480 (Utah 1975).
We have held t h a t the Governmental Immunity Act must be
strictly applied. As we explained in Epting v. State, the
codification of sovereign immunity mandates stringent
enforcement, since it is through the Governmental Immunity Act
t h a t the "legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as
essential to the protection of the state in rendering the many and
ever increasing number of governmental services."
Hall v. Utah State Dept ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, fU,

24 P.3d 958 (citations

omitted). In Hall, this Court held t h a t the requirements of the notice of claim
provision of the immunity act had to be precisely complied with. Id. at ^23 ("In
other words, where the government grants statutory rights of action against
itself, any conditions placed on those rights must be followed precisely/').
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An action brought under the immunity act is a claimant's exclusive
remedy and a claimant may only sue a government employee personally in
certain circumstances:
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee
for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive
remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action
or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud
or malice; . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) (emphasis added).
The act further contains a global notice of claim provision that operates
as a jurisdictional precondition to bringing any suit. See Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 1999 UT 36, <|[18, 977 P.2d 1201 (holding that failure to file notice of
claim that complied with all of the immunity act's requirements deprived the
court of subject matter jurisdiction). The notice of claim provision applies to all
claims brought against a governmental entity or a government employee:
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental
entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,

11

regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Lewis,
2001 UT 49, fll,

26 P.3d 217 ("Indeed, by its terms, the notice of claim

provision is global in application. It therefore applies to all actions for any
claim it describes unless the statute or law authorizing the specific action at
issue expressly, or by necessary implication, indicates otherwise.") (emphasis
added). This Court has noted that, "[w]hen applying the notice provision in the
past, we have called for strict compliance to the Immunity Act before
determining that the State waived its immunity. Strict compliance constitutes
adherence to all of the relevant provisions outlined in the Immunity Act." Li v.
Univ. of Utah, 2006 UT 57, f8, 144 P.3d 1142 (emphasis added).
Among other things, the notice of claim must set forth the nature of the
claim asserted: "The notice of claim shall set forth: (i) a brief statement of the
facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the
claimant so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3). To properly
state the nature of the claim asserted, a claimant must identify whether any
claims are brought as personal capacity claims against the state employees
themselves. The proper filing of a notice of claim is not merely a statute of
limitation but "is a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit."

12

Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992).
This court stated that "[w]e have previously addressed questions regarding . . .
failure to set forth the nature of the claim asserted . . . . In each of those
instances, we have dismissed claims when they fail to follow the unambiguous
language of the Immunity Act." Li, 2006 UT 57 at \lb.
Defendants' motion to dismiss was based on this jurisdictional
precondition. Defendants argued that Mecham's notice of claim did not
properly identify the nature of the claim asserted - personal capacity claims
against the officers - because she failed to expressly aver fraud or malice. If
Mecham indeed failed to satisfy this jurisdictional precondition, she was barred
from filing suit and defendants were not merely immunized from liability. As
set forth below, Mecham's notice of claim failed to satisfy this jurisdictional
precondition and the interlocutory appeal was therefore proper under the
collateral order doctrine as an appeal from a denial of a claim of immunity from
suit.

2.

A claimant must specifically aver fraud or malice in her notice of claim
to satisfy the immunity act's notice of claim requirements.

The second question posed by the Tenth Circuit is: Does the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act require that a Notice of Claim against state

13

officials in their individual capacity expressly aver "fraud" or "malice"?
This Court held in Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,1120, 26 P.3d 217, that,
to bring a personal capacity claim, a claimant must expressly allege fraud or
malice. Moreover, in Thomas this Court expressly agreed with the reasoning of
the Utah Court of Appeals in Straley v. Halliday, 2000 UT App 38, 997 P.2d
338, where a notice of claim was deemed insufficient for failing to allege fraud
or malice, even though the notice of claim contained facts from which malice
might have been inferred. Thomas at 1(14.
Straley involved a statutory claim against a state judge. The statute
authorized a forfeiture action against any judge who wrongfully and willfully
refused to allow a writ of habeas corpus. Straley's notice of claim alleged that
the judge had violated the statute by wrongfully and willfully denying
plaintiffs petition for a writ. The notice did not, however, include an express
allegation that the judge had acted with fraud or malice. Id. at ^15. A second,
untimely and defectively served, notice of claim did expressly allege that the
judge acted with fraud or malice. Id. at \1Q. The Court of Appeals concluded
that the failure of first notice of claim to expressly allege that the judge acted
with fraud or malice was jurisdictional in nature and deprived the courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over Straley's claims.

14

Straley's first notice of claim failed to assert that Judge Halliday
acted with fraud or malice in denying his petition. As mentioned
above, Straley's action cannot be maintained against Judge
Halliday personally absent the allegation of fraud or malice. Thus,
although the first notice of claim was sufficient in terms of the first
complaint, Straley's action as framed in that complaint must fail. .
. . Because no action may be maintained against Judge Halliday
personally absent the allegation of fraud or malice, this variance
"is much more than a mere expansion or amplification of what was
alleged in the notice," and the first notice of claim is insufficient for
the action as framed in the amended complaint.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah
1990)).
Significantly, it was not enough that Straley's first notice of claim had
alleged facts from which malice may have been inferred - that the judge acted
wrongfully and willfully. Those allegations were insufficient absent an express
allegation of malice. Without an allegation that a state employee acted with
fraud or malice, the causes of action against the employee are in a
representative capacity, and not against the employee personally. Such a
claim is the equivalent of suing the government and not the employee. Straley's
second notice of claim "rectified this problem" by asserting that the judge had
"acted with fraud or malice." Straley at 'ft 16. And though Straley's second notice
would have been sufficient simply by adding an express allegation of fraud or
malice, it was untimely and improperly served and therefore also deficient. Id.

15

In Thomas, this Court expressly stated its agreement with the Utah
Court of Appeals' reasoning in Straley. See Thomas, 2001 UT 49 at \1A (stating
that "[w]e agree with the reasoning of that case"). Further, in reiterating that a
claimant "must additionally allege fraud or malice" to bring a personal capacity
claim,3 this Court again cited to Straley. Thomas at H20 n . l l (also citing Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)).
Unless Mecham can demonstrate that Thomas and Straley should be
reversed, a claimant's notice of claim must expressly allege fraud or malice to
adequately state the nature of her asserted claim. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d
393, 398-99 (Utah 1999) ("[t]hose asking us to overturn prior precedent have a
substantial burden of persuasion"). Mecham's claims are jurisdictionally barred
because she did not specifically allege that the Troopers acted with fraud or
malice. Because Mecham's notice of claim failed to strictly comply with the
requirements of Utah's immunity act, the federal district court was without
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mecham's state law claims.

3

This is as opposed to being sued in a representative capacity where
the actual party in interest would be the government entity. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-4(3) (West 2004).
16

CONCLUSION
Utah's immunity act confers on state officers an immunity from suit
when a plaintiff fails to comply with the act's notice of claim requirements.
When a plaintiff fails to comply with those requirements, her lawsuit is barred
because she has failed to meet a jurisdictional precondition to bring suit. The
state officers plaintiff seeks to sue are therefore immune from suit and not
merely immune from liability.
To bring a claim against a state officer personally, a plaintiffs notice of
claim must specifically aver that the state officer acted with malice, not merely
allege facts from which malice can be inferred. Because plaintiff did not
specifically allege fraud or malice in her notice of claim, her state law claims
are jurisdictionally barred under Utah's governmental immunity act.
Dated this lv "clay of January, 2008.

J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS to the following this Z ^ r d a y of
January, 2008:
Cory B. Mattson
9677 South 700 East, #D
Sandy, UT 84070

tf^—
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ADDENDUM 1
Mecham's Notice of Claim (Aplt. App. 33)

Cory BMattson (#9292)
480 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
801-983-0093
Attorney for Claimant

NOTICE OF CLAIM
TO: THE UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
and THE STATE OF UTAH:
This letter serves as a Notice of Claim against the State of Utah and the above listed agencies
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 12.
IDENTITY OF CLAIMANT
Name:

Lamanda Lillian Mecham

Address:

1457 East 11245 South
Sandy, UT 84092
TIME AND LOCATION OF INCIDENT

The incident or loss occurred on SR 15 (Interstate Highway 15) near mile post 322 on the
southbound side of the highway. The date was February 23,2003. The time was between the hours
of 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. The citation number assigned is U67766279. The case number is 0303-0344.
NATURE OF CLAIMS
This is a claim for the torts of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution against Trooper Sean D. Frazier
and Trooper David L. Johnson. Ms. Mecham asserts that the troopers used unreasonable and
excessive force in arresting her. Ms. Mecham asserts that the troopers were negligent in their use
of force which negligence caused her permanent and chronic injury. Ms. Mecham also asserts her
claim for violation of her right to be free of unreasonable seizure of her person under Article 1,
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Though Ms. Mecham disputes that she is
required by the laws of the State of Utah to give notice of claims brought under § 1983 of the federal
Civil Rights Act, Ms. Mecham also asserts her claim for violation of her civil rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure of her person.

Notice of CI aim
January 16,2004
Page 2
PERSONS INVOLVED
The persons involved were Trooper Sean D. Frazier, Trooper David L. Johnson, and
Lamanda Lillian Mecham. Ms. Mecham's mother, Tisha Mecham, witnessed parts of the
conversations between Lamanda and Trooper Frazier over the cell phone. A witness of the battery
and arrest was Sean Scheer, a tow truck operator.
At all times material hereto, Troopers Frazier and Johnson were employees of the Utah
Highway Patrol, an agency of the Utah Department of Public Safety which is a department of the
State of Utah. Troopers Frazier and Johnson were acting within the course and scope of their
employment as state highway patrol troopers when committing all acts herein alleged
CIRCUMSTANCES
On February 23, 2003, Ms. Mecham was driving southbound on Interstate 15 near mile
marker 322 when she was pulled over by a car which appeared to be a highway patrol vehicle. An
individual later identified as Trooper Frazier approached her car and told her that she was being
pulled over for driving 5 miles per hour over the speed limit and for failing to wear her seatbelt.
Ms. Mecham was surprised at this charge because she felt she was operating her vehicle at
a reasonable speed and noticed that she was being passed by many other vehicles during the time that
she was pulled over. Trooper Frazier then requested her license and registration for her car. She
produced her Arizona driver's license and the registration for the car. Trooper Fiazier then went
back to his vehicle to check the license and registration.
Some moments later, Trooper Frazier again approached Ms. Mecham's car and told her that
her license was suspended and that he was going to impound the car. She became very distraught
and feared for her safety. She began to doubt the identity of the officer because she knew of no basis
for her license to be suspended and feared that Trooper Frazier may have been using a pretext to get
her out of her car. During the time that she was speaking with Trooper Frazier, she was contacted
on her cell phone by her mother, Tisha Mecham, who she had called earlier. Ms. Mecham was very
fearful for her safety and worried that she would lose the connection with her mother if she hung up
so she continued to speak with her mother while the Trooper Frazier waited. During the
conversation, Trooper Frazier left and went back to his car.
Tisha Mecham could hear the conversation on the other end of the line between Lamanda
Mecham and Trooper Frazier. She began to worry for her daughter's safety and began driving
toward the location of the stop. Mrs. Mecham advised her daughter to stay in her car and ask the
officer to call for backup so that she would be reassured of the trooper's identity.

-2-

Notice of Claim
January 16,2004
Page 3
When Trooper Frazier returned to the car again, he told Ms. Mecham that he was going to
have her car towed to impound and that he was going to arrest her for interfering with an officer.
Ms. Mecham was speaking with her mother at the time of this conversation with Trooper Frazier and
repeatedly asked him to speak with her mother. It was at that point that Trooper Frazier demanded
that she get out of her car so that he could put her under arrest. She again asked him to speak with
her mother to explain the charges. He refused and deployed his pepper spray in her face. He then
forcibly and violently dragged her out of the car and threw her down on the road surface to the rear
of her car. He handcuffed her and then dragged her farther off the road. Lamanda was very scared
and, at one point, lost consciousness.
Trooper Frazier requested an ambulance and Lamanda was taken to the hospital where she
was treated for pepper spray and released. She was later booked into the Davis County Jail.
In the weeks and months after the incident, Lamanda had severe pain and discomfort in her
neck and upper shoulders. She has sought medical attention and has been told that her condition is
a result of being thrown to the ground and handcuffed during the arrest. She continues to experience
chronic discomfort and pain from this condition.
AH charges against her arising from the incident were later dropped.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT & NEGLIGENCE
Troopers Frazier and Johnson unreasonably arrested Ms. Mecham which constituted an
unreasonable seizure of her person in violation of the 4,h Amendment to the United States
Constitution. They also committed the civil torts of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, abuse
ofprocess, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Ms. Mecham alleges
that the troopers' actions were unreasonable and were calculated to physically injure, intimidate, and
terrorize her. The troopers were negligent in their use of force which caused permanent physical
injury to Ms. Mecham. The troopers violated Lamanda Mecham*s state and federal civil rights to
the extent that they seized her person contrary to law.
NATURE OF INJURIES AND OTHER DAMAGES
Lamanda Mecham has suffered chronic orthopedic injury to her neck and back as a result of
the ex cessi ve and unreasonable force used against her by Troopers Frazier and Johnson. By dragging
her out of her car and throwing her to the ground, the troopers injured the connective tissues in her
neck, which injuries continue to cause pain and discomfort. The deployment of the pepper spray,
handcuffing and other rough handling during the arrest caused pain, aching, and general discomfort.
Lamanda Mecham has also suffered mental and emotional distress as a result of the incident
to the extent that she has experienced anxiety and sleeplessness.
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She also suffered lost wages as a result of missing time at her employment. Ms. Mecham
was additionally had to pay the towing and impound fees to recover her vehicle. Because of the
charges leveled against her by Trooper Frazier, Ms. Mecham was forced to retain a criminal defense
attorney to def&nd her and, thereby, incurred attorney fees.
DATED this 16th day of January, 2004.

'i±M
CORY BMATTSOn
Attomewfor Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF FILING & MAILING
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CLAIM was sent via certified
mail to the following, postage prepaid, this /V^day of January, 2004.

Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Robert L. Flowers, Commissioner
Department of Public Safety
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Rick Wyss
Utah Department of Public Safety
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
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ADDENDUM 2
Determinative Statutes

FORMER G O V E R N M E N T A L I M M U N I T Y ACT

§ 63-30-3 Immunity of governmental entities
from suit
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided m
this chapter, all governmental entities are lm
mune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility, and
from an approved medical nursing or other
professional health care clinical training pro
gram conducted in either public or pnvate facilities
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique
or essential core governmental functions and,
notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63-30-10, governmental enti
ties political subdivisions, and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from the implementation of
or the failure to
(a) implement measures to control the causes
of epidemic and communicable diseases and
other conditions significantly affecting the public health or necessary to protect the public
health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local
Health Departments,
(b) investigate and control suspected bioter
ronsm and disease as set out in Title 26 Chap
ter 23b Detection of Public Health Emergencies
Act and
(c) respond to a national state or local emer
gency a public health emergency as defined in
Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the
President of the United States or other federal
official requesting public health related activi
ties
(3)(a) For the purposes of this chapter only
the following state medical programs and ser
vices performed at a state owned university hos
pital are unique or essential to the core of
governmental activity in this state and are con
sidered to be governmental functions
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospi
tal or physician because of the high risk nature
of the patient's medical condition,
(u) high risk care or procedures available in
Utah only at a state owned university hospital
or provided in Utah only by physicians em
ployed at a state owned university acting in the
scope of their employment
(m) care of patients who cannot receive ap
propriate medical care or treatment at another
medical facility in Utah, and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed
a
* a state owned university hospital or by physi
cians employed at a state-owned university act
m
g in the scope of their employment that a
court finds is unique or essential to the core of
governmental activity in this state
(b) If any claim under this Subsection (3)
exceeds the limits established in Section

63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess
claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6
(4) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems
by governmental entities a r e considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's
Justice Center are immune from suit for any
injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title
62A, Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services
Laws 1965, c 139, § 3, Laws 1978, c 27,
§ 2, Laws 1981, c 116, § 2, Laws 1984, c 33,
§ 1, Laws 1985, c 93, § 1, Laws 1991, c 15,
§ 1, Laws 1991, c 248, § 7, Laws 2003, c 3,
§ 5,eff May 5, 2003
See, now, § 63-30d-201
§ 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial of liability—Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of
employee—Limitations on personal liability
(l)(a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as
an admission or denial of liability or responsi
bihty by or for governmental entities or their
employees
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this
chapter consent to be sued is granted and
liability of the entity shall be determined as if
the entity were a private person
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is
created by any waiver of immunity in this chap
ter, nor may any provision of this chapter be
construed as imposing strict liability or absolute
liability
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed
as adversely affecting any immunity from suit
that a governmental entity or employee may
otherwise assert under state or federal law
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection
(3)(b), an action under this chapter against a
governmental entity or its employee for an inju
ry caused by an act or omission that occurs
d u n n g the performance of the employee s
duties, within the scope of employment, or un
der color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive
remedy
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any
other civil action or proceeding based upon the
same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim, unless
(I) the employee acted or failed to act through
fraud or malice,
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(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the
conditions
set
forth
in
Subsection
63-30-36(3)(c); or
(iii) in a judiciahor administrative proceeding
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave,
upon a lawful oath o r in any form allowed by
law as a substitute for a n oath, false testimony
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under
this section.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained
of is one for which the governmental entity may
be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority, unless it is established that:
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to
fraud or malice;
(b) the injury or damage resulted from the
conditions
set
forth
in
Subsection
63-30-36(3)(c); or
(c) in a judicial or administrative proceeding
the employee intentionally or knowingly gave,
upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by
law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony
material to the issue or matter of inquiry under
this section.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 4; Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 3; Laws 1983, c. 129, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 76,
§ 1, Laws 2002, c. 206, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002.
See, now, § 63-30d-202.
§ 63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights
or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12,
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure
to deliver water from a reservoir or associated
facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear
River Development Act, if the failure to deliver
the contractual amount of water is due to
drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the amount of
available water.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 5; Laws 1975, c. 189,
§ 1; Laws 1978, c. 27, § 4; Laws 1983, c 129,
§ 4, Laws 1985, c. 82, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 251,
§ 1.
See now, § 6 3 - 3 0 d - 3 0 1 .
§ 63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions
involving property
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of any property

real or personal or for the possession thereof or
to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages
or other hens thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication
touching any mortgage or other lien said entity
may have or claim on the property involved.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 6/
See, now, § '63-30d-301.
§ 63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for negligent
damage, destruction or loss of seized property
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any claim based on the
negligent destruction, damage or loss of goods,
merchandise or other property while in the possession of any officer or agency of state or local
government, including law enforcement officers, if the property was seized for the purpose
of forfeiture under any provision of state law.
Initiative B, adopted Nov. 7, 2000, eff. March
20, 2001.
§ 63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other structures
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located on them.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 8. Laws 1991, c. 76,
§ 2.
See, now, § 63-30d-301.
§ 63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury
from dangerous or defective public building,
structure, or other public improvement—Exception
Unless the injury arises out of one or more'of
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from
a dangerous or defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
public improvement.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 9; Laws 1991, c. 76,
§3.
See, now, § 63-30d-301.
§ 63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or omission of employee—Exceptions
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission off an employee committed within the scope of employment except if
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from:
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§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury—-Notice—Contents—Service—Legal disability—Appointment
of guardian ad litem
(1) A claim arises when the statute ,pfj limitations that would apply if the claim were against
a private person begins to run
(2) Any person having a claim for injury
against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of t h e employee's"duties,
within the scope of employment, or tinder color
of authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity ^before maintaining an action,
regardless »of w h e t h e r or not the'function giving
rise tor the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(I) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so
far as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or
that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim
is against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is
against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board,
when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, when
the claim is against any other public bpard,
commission, or body.
(4)(a) If, the claimant is under the age of
majority, pr mentally incompetent and without
a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the
claimant may apply to the court to extend'the
time for service of notice of claim.
(b)(i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend the time for
service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an
extension, the court shall consider whether the
delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
(d)(i) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result'in a claim against a governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant
described in Subsection (4)(a), that government

entity may file .a* request with the court for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the
potential claimant.
j(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under
this Subsection (4)(d), the time fort filing a claim
under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins
when the order appointing the guardian is issued.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 11; Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 5; Laws 1983, c. 131,' § 1; Laws 1987, c. 75,
§ 4; Laws 1991, c. 76, § 6; Laws 1998, c. 164,
§ L eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 157,.§ 1,
eff. July 1,2001.
See, now, § 63-30d-401.
§ 63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee^—Time for filing notice
A claim against the state, or against jts employee for an act or omission occurring during
the performance of the employee's duties, with,in the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the attorney general within one year
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not * the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized
as governmental.
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 12; Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 6; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 75,
§ 5; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998.
See, now, § 63-30d-402.
§ 63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee—Time for filing notice
A claim against a political subdivision, or
against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of t h e employee's duties, within the scope of employment,
or +mder color of authority, is barred unless
notice of claim is filed with the governing body
of the political subdivision according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized
as governmental
Laws 1965, c 139, § 13; Laws 1978, c. 27,
§ 7, Laws 1983, c. 131, § 3; Laws 1937, c. 75,
§ 6, Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998.
See, now, § 63-30d-402.
§ 63-30-14. Claim for injury—Approval or
denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within ninety days
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim1 the
governmental entity o r its insurance carrier
shall act thereon and notify the claimant*in
writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall
be deemed to have been denied if at the end oof
the ninety-day period the governmental entity of

